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Content of the main chapters 
The following part summarizes the main chapters of the 
dissertation which are three different papers about centralisation. 
Both summaries describe the background of the research, the main 
questions and motivations, the research methods, the results and 
conclusions. Every paper summary ends with suggestions for 
managers and fellow researchers. The description of these 
chapters are crucial for the final section because they provide 
theoretical background for the management accelerator effect.   
1.  Comparison of Calculation and Corporate Planning 
Debate about Centralisation 
The first chapter is a theoretical paper about the historical 
background of centralisation theory describing the similarities 
between two debates about central planning. The first one was 
Hayek and Langes’s calculation debate happened between 1930s 
and 1950s and the second was the corporate planning debate of 
the 1990s between Ansoff and Mintzberg. The paper shows the 
similarities of the debates and analyses the general nature of 
planning which provides theoretical basis for the next two 
chapters.   
Research background. This research was conducted between 2012 
and 2014. The main inspiration for the research came from 
Kornai’s system theory works (1990; 2011; 2012; 2013) which 
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analyse the nature of socialist and capitalist economies. Based on 
my previous management science background I found some 
similar phenomena between corporate and economic planning. In 
2012 I had the opportunity to visit professor Kornai’s research 
seminar where I could elaborate my research. That time I started 
to examine the calculation debate in-depth.  
During 2013 I could also visit professor Balaton’s strategic 
management seminar. Once during an office hour he mentioned if 
I was interested in planning I should have read the debate of 
Ansoff (1991; 1994) and Mintzberg (1990; 1991) as well. After 
understanding the most important papers of the topic I realised 
two things. (1) The two debates have a lot of similarities.  Albeit 
they happened in different times and contexts but both of them are 
about the nature of planning. (2) These similarities are not widely 
researched. I found very few papers analysing the relationship of 
economic and corporate-level planning. 
Moreover I had to realise that economics and management 
sciences develop the field of planning in separate ways. In 2015 I 
had the opportunity to take part in a Strategic Management 
Society conference about headquarter-business unit relationships 
where very few planning or centralisation-related papers 
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examined economic theories. Therefore I started to look for a 
general nature of planning based on the two debates mentioned 
above. 
In 2015 this paper was published by the Hungarian Economic 
Review.  
 
1. Figure Content of the first chapter.  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Question and method.  The purpose of the first chapter is to 
answer the following question: what the main arguments of 
centralisation can be identified. The method of the paper is based 
on content analysis of the most significant articles of the field. 
During the examination of the sources I noted the main 
breakpoints and statements. Then I looked for patterns and 
similarities in both the calculation and the corporate planning 
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debate. Of the dozens of characteristics, five criteria were the 
most frequently recurring elements in both debates which will be 
elaborated in the following chapter. 
Results. The five issues are the following: the role of the 
headquarters; the behaviour of the organisation; information 
available to the organisation; differences of planning and 
implementation; and dynamism (Figure 1). Both debates pay a lot 
of attention on these topics which can be used to identify the most 
important centralisation-related arguments listed below (Table 2).  
Conclusions. This research has several implications which are 
used in the following chapters. First, planning has general nature. 
On the one hand, it is worth applying or at least examining each 
other’s planning models of economics and management science. 
On the other hand, one can identify political and economic 
arguments in such debates that are independent of the specific 
historical era or business entity concerned. Two of the most 
important statements are the following: (1) centralisation is good 
at global efficiency because it can make company-wide 
optimisations. (2) Decentralisation fosters innovation by local 
adaptation because it allows experimentations on the lower levels 
of the organisation as well. 
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 Arguments for central 
planning 
Arguments against 
central planning 
Role of the 
centre 
Central planning could 
ensure optimisation for 
the whole organisation. 
The central body cannot 
redistribute the resources 
properly. 
Behaviour of 
the 
organisation  
The plans of the centre 
are designed according 
to the interests of the 
whole organisation, so 
it is in the interest of its 
members to cooperate. 
Unless the members of 
the organisation are 
directly encouraged to 
cooperate, the central 
plans will not be useful 
for the organisation.  
Information 
available to the 
organisation  
The centre is capable of 
(quasi) optimal resource 
allocation; that’s where 
every piece of 
information should be 
directed. 
The members of the 
organisation will always 
possess more topical local 
information that cannot be 
transferred to the centre 
adequately. 
Planning and 
implementation 
Both planning and 
control are facilitated by 
the strict separation of 
the planning and the 
implementation stages. 
The implementation of 
plans drawn up earlier 
may not be adequate for 
the organisation at the 
given moment of time.  
Dynamism Significant change can 
only be realised by 
central planning. 
Adaptation to significant 
change can only be 
ensured through the trials 
and errors of the members 
of the organisation. 
1. Table Arguments for and against central planning.  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Second, centralisation and decentralisation are the two ends of the 
same continuum. The “illusion of extremities” part of the paper 
describes that neither end of the scale can provide successful long-
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term solution for the organisations. Too much decentralisation can 
result in uncoordinated activities and thereby in failure of 
organisational operations. On the other hand too much 
centralisation can cause too rigid structures and too much 
overhead costs. Instead of choosing only one side, companies are 
moving on the continuum perpetually to find the right balance 
between global efficiency and local adaptation. 
Suggestions for researchers. It is always hard to identify the 
boarders of a research but in the case of a comparison of two or 
more debates it is a crucial question. It is easy to add only one 
more article to the analysis but in the long run it can significantly 
deform the original research focus. To avoid this threat 
researchers must clearly identify the definitions beforehand (e.g. 
planning or centralisation). It helps keep research in order. 
Suggestions for managers. Considering centralisation there is 
always a trade-off between global efficiency and local adaptation 
(or efficiency and innovation). It is not easy to find the right 
balance or to choose the adequate structure. But the main 
arguments of centralisation and decentralisation are always the 
same. The next chapter helps better understand how managers 
change concentration of authority in the time of crisis. 
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Further researches. This paper examined where the decisions 
should be made within the organisation (in the central 
headquarters or in the subunits). I think one of the most important 
theoretical topics of this field is the question of how decisions 
should be made (in authoritarian or democratic way). My master 
thesis examined democratic leadership therefore I could see how 
developed the management science is in this field. I think it would 
be interesting to compare a management science and a political 
science debate about authoritarian and democratic leadership. 
That can develop an alternative theoretical background for 
centralisation as well. 
2. Centralisation of strategic decisions during the Great 
Recession 
The second chapter is an empirical paper describing how 
economic crisis influences concentration of authority. Based on 
the EFIGE dataset this chapter can analyse one of the largest 
samples (more than 14,000 companies) of centralisation 
researches. The most important results of the multinomial logistic 
regression model are the following: (1) crisis increases the 
probability of centralisation; (2) centralisation is associated with 
other short-term policies; and (3) those companies which 
centralised during the crises realised slower growth in the next 3 
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years. These findings are the empirical background of the 
centralisation cycle conjecture. 
Research background. Crisis and centralisation relationship was 
the original research topic of my PhD thesis which idea came 
from my master thesis. During analysing democratic leadership I 
conducted several interviews with organisational development 
consultants. The crisis-centralisation inspiration was based on two 
different interviews. One interviewee mentioned that in the time 
of crisis democratic forms decrease in populace. And few days 
later another consultant stated centralisation is less good at 
innovation. Based on these sources I formulated a research plan 
which was accepted to the PhD program in 2012. 
I am sure this paper (or probably the whole thesis) could not have 
been completed if I had not met professor Muraközy in 2014. That 
time I asked him to give me feedback on my research when he 
mentioned he had a dataset with information about centralisation 
and crisis of thousands of companies from 2009. Thankfully I 
could join professor Muraközy’s research group at Institute of 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences where I could 
finish this study. During my research between 2014 and 2015 I 
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could examine centralisation from both economics and 
management science perspectives.  
Different versions of this paper were presented in several 
conferences such as symposiums of Association for International 
Business (2014), Hungarian Society of Economists (2014) and 
Strategic Management Society (2015). Based on several 
feedbacks, in 2016 with professor Muraközy, we rewrote the 
paper of which first draft is published as a working paper 
(Bakonyi and Muraközy, 2016). The final version is under review 
at an international journal. 
Question and method. The main question of the second chapter is 
that how crisis influences concentration of authority. There are 
several papers which examined centralisation in the time of 
depression. This paper has three main contributions to the 
literature (1) it analyses one of the largest sample of the field; (2) 
it examines the relation of centralisation to other crisis policies as 
well; and (3) it investigates the mid-term performance differences 
on the same sample.  
The European Firms in Global Economy: international polices for 
external competitiveness (EFIGE) project surveyed 14,759 
companies about various topics between 2009 and 2010. It is a 
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representative sample of European industrial (10+ employees) 
firms from seven countries: Austria (443), France (2,973), 
Germany (2,935), Hungary (488), Italy (3,021), Spain (2,832), and 
the United Kingdom (2,067) (Altomonte and Aquilante, 2012, p. 
6.).  
Examining the main question a multinomial logistic regression 
model was applied where the dependent variable was the change 
in authority concentration. It could be -1 if the company became 
more decentralised in 2009; +1 if it became more centralised; or 0 
if there was no change at all. 
Crisis, as the main dependent variable, was measured by the 
change of turnover from 2008 to 2009 (%). It was supported by 
various control variables such as country, size, and industry. To 
test the robustness of the results additional control variables were 
added to the original model as well. 
In terms of measuring short-term strategic focus, we use a number 
of variables. The first of these measures was whether the firm 
considers cost-cutting as key to future success. This is measured 
by the answer to the following question: “With respect to your 
business, indicate the main competitive factors which will 
determine the success of your firm in the next years”. Managers 
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answered to the question spontaneously, and the dummy is 1 if 
they mentioned lowering production cost as such a factor. Change 
in investment is a dummy coming from a similar question: 
“During 2009 has your firm reduced its planned investments in 
machinery, equipment or ICT?”. Finally, we also include a 
variable measuring whether the firm laid off any employees.  
We have complemented these survey data in two respects. First, 
we were able to collect balance sheet and income statement data 
for 2009 and 2012 from the AMADEUS database for a large 
subset (nearly 8,000 firms) of the dataset which enables us to 
study the post-crisis performance of these firms. Second, during 
2014 and 2015 we have made follow-up interviews with the top 
managers of 7 Hungarian and 6 UK firms to understand better 
their experience and help us to formulate our hypotheses. The 
chapter will use a few quotes from these interviews when 
discussing our hypotheses. Please note, in this paper the 
interviews are only illustrations for the theory-building. The 
methodology will be described in depth in the third chapter of the 
dissertation. 
Results. The main findings of the paper were the following: (1) 
crisis increases the probability of centralisation; (2) centralisation 
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is a complementary tactic to other crisis policies; and (3) 
centralisators realise smaller mid-term revenue growth. 
Interestingly there was no industry effect while most countries 
have different centralisation habits (Figure 2). 
 
2. Figure Content of the second chapter.  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Conclusions. Albeit centralisation decreases three-year growth, 
companies implement such policy. This reaction emphasises the 
importance of behavioural approach to centralisation. There are 
several papers in the literature which state, during crisis 
decentralisation is the optimal choice, but still companies prefer 
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centralisation. The purpose of the third chapter is to understand 
this behaviour. 
Second, if crisis fosters centralisation, recovery may do the 
opposite. This hypothesis leads us to centralisation cycle 
conjecture describing that concentration of authority changes 
according to economic cycles. This concept will be the basis for 
the third chapter and the management accelerator effect.  
Suggestions for researchers. Certainly definitions of centralisation 
can vary among papers. But even companies can define it in 
different ways which can hamper the clear understanding of the 
results. This paper focused on centralisation in strategic decision-
making.  
Suggestions for managers. In the short run centralisation can be 
very useful for companies to support cost-cutting and short-term 
actions. But in the long run it hampers firm growth, thus firms 
should reconsider their strategic decision-making systems 
regularly.  
Further researches. This chapter was a cross-sectional analysis but 
a longitudinal one could better describe the centralisation cycles. 
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Because of the lack of time-series data, the cycles remain only a 
conjecture.  
3. Why do firms centralise during the crisis even if it is 
not optimal? 
This qualitative chapter shows that companies centralise because 
(1) managers think it is more effective; (2) they expect it makes 
communication easier; and (3) they lose their confidence in the 
middle managers during crisis. The interviews with British and 
Hungarian senior managers support the hypothesis of 
centralisation cycles viz. there may be a link between 
decentralisation and prosperity. Based on the empirical results a 
theoretical model is formulated which describes why companies 
maintain centralisation longer than it is optimal. Furthermore it 
provides a concept describing how adequate adaptation to 
economic cycles can result in competitive advantage. 
Research background. The third chapter starts where the second 
one ended, namely after the econometric description of crisis-
centralisation relationship it focuses on the root-causes of 
authority concentration during depression. 
The methodological background of the chapter was mostly 
inspired by professor Bokor’s qualitative methods PhD course 
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which I could visit in 2012. In 2013 a preliminary research was 
conducted based on some unofficial meetings with company 
managers and some interviews in Hungary and in India where I 
spent three months as a business intern of Tata Consultancy 
Services. The information and interview experiences acquired 
during this stage became extremely important when I formulated 
the final research plan.  
The actual research was conducted between 2014 and 2015. After 
a long period of interview making, the empirical data was 
analysed and structured. The current version of the paper was 
finished in 2016.  
The previous versions of this paper were presented in the 
following forums: Conference of Hungarian Society of 
Economists (2015); Strategic Management Society Conference 
(2016); and Budapest Management Review (2016). The final 
version is under review at an international journal.   
Question and method. The main contribution of this paper to the 
literature is the qualitative analysis of centralisation decisions. As 
it was discussed before the second chapter showed that crisis 
fosters centralisation. But based on a longitudinal empirical 
analysis Aghion and Bloom (2014) state decentralisation is more 
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beneficial during the crisis because it increases total factor 
productivity and growth. Therefore the main question of this 
chapter is that if decentralisation results in better performance 
why companies still centralise in the time of depression.  
This research is an interview-based grounded analysis. The 
sample was based on the dataset of the EFIGE described in-depth 
in the previous chapter. Because of language barriers only English 
and Hungarian companies were analysed this time. To understand 
the centralisation decisions I tried to find those companies which 
(1) faced more than 20% turnover decrease in 2009; (2) 
centralised or decentralised their strategic decision making in 
2009; (3) still operate (in 2014 or 2015); and (4) have at least one 
senior executive who was the manager of the company in 2009. 
To meet these selection criteria I searched the EFIGE dataset and 
the internet. 
As a result 6 Hungarian and 6 English interviews were conducted 
in 2014 and 2015. Therefore with the one preliminary research 
interview from 2013 I had a sample of 13 companies. All of the 
(approximately 45-90 minute-long) interviews were recorded, 
typed word-by-word and after that sent back to the interviewees 
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for possible edition or comments. Only the final, reviewed 
versions were used for the analysis.  
At this point I must mention that all of my interviewees were very 
helpful and kind, therefore I would like to thank them. 
Unfortunately because of confidentiality agreements their names 
must remain hidden. 
Results. Before examining the reasons of centralisation or 
decentralisation the chapter provides a rather long description 
about the process how companies react to crisis. Later it becomes 
very important because it will be the theoretical background for 
the model of centralisation cycles. 
Based on the interviews centralisation is a crisis tactic. It can 
strengthen efficiency because it decreases the time of decision-
making and allows firms to have a company-wide focus during 
considering crisis tactics. Furthermore even lack of trust can foster 
centralisation. Interestingly very few disadvantages of 
centralisation emerged during the interviews. Moreover nobody 
mentioned that centralisation may hamper innovation. 
While crisis and centralisation relationship was rather strong and 
clear during the interviews I hardly find evidences for a link 
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between depression and decentralisation. Companies in the 
sample decentralised because they wanted to involve new 
knowledge or information to the top decision units. But most of 
these decentralisation programs started before the crisis and they 
were related to previous growth or diversification rather than the 
depression (Figure 3). 
 
3. Figure Content of the third chapter.  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Conclusions. The qualitative study supported the centralisation 
cycle conjecture viz. in the time of crisis companies centralise 
while during prosperity they do the opposite. But based on the 
interviews this adaptation to the economic cycles is not perfect 
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namely, some companies maintain centralisation even in 
prosperity. The final part of the paper formulates a theoretical 
model describing why companies maintain centralisation. The two 
main reasons are (1) the imperfect perceiving of economic cycles; 
and (2) the love of power. 
Thereby we can state some companies are better at adaptation to 
economic cycles than others which can provide competitive 
advantage. Those companies which can centralise faster in the 
time of crisis can gain more efficiency than their competitors. And 
if the recovery starts those firms which decentralise more quickly 
can become more flexible than the rivals. This is the adaptation 
advantage. 
Suggestions for researchers. First, very few interviewee 
remembered centralisation immediately. They either forgot it or 
did not use the word of centralisation for their action. Therefore I 
decided to mention their survey answers from EFIGE database 
which helped them recall the happenings.  
Second, interestingly some kind of positive nostalgia emerged 
during recalling downturn. This “veteran” or “survival” emotion 
can influence their memories about the time of crisis. This 
phenomenon can be a very interesting research topic as well. 
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Suggestions for managers. First, centralisation has downsides 
therefore if it is maintained in a long run it can decrease company 
profitability. E.g. very few interviewees mentioned that 
centralisation can hamper innovation. Second, adequate reaction 
to economic cycles can provide competitive advantage. (1) 
Insightful environment perceiving mechanisms (e.g. controlling 
systems, relationship with stakeholders) and (2) thoughtful change 
management skills (e.g. small resistance to change or lack of 
power hunger) can lead to adaptive advantage. 
Further research. In addition to “crisis nostalgia” phenomenon it 
would be interesting to conduct a longitudinal case study analysis 
about economic cycles and adaptive advantage. Furthermore this 
research should be continued on an Italian sample because 
according to previous results Italian companies are more open to 
centralise than Hungarian and English ones.  
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